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Stanford University and NBER
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper explores efficiency and equity issues related to the introduc-
tion of a withholding tax on foreigners' interest income from their in-
vestments in the U.S. Because of existing treaty obligations and tax-
avoidance options, the effective tax rate of any practicable withholding
tax is likely to be considerably below its statutory rate. A statutory 30
percent U.S. withholding tax on portfolio interest, if not accompanied
by similar (retaliatory) tax measures introduced by foreign governments,
appears to yield aggregate domestic welfare gains. The gains are at-
tributable to U.S. financial market power stemming from the large share
represented by the U.S. of world financial transactions and from the
imperfect substitutability between U.S. and foreign securities in port-
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and Larry Summers for helpful suggestions. I also thank Margaret Lewis of the Foreign
Returns Analysis Section of the Internal Revenue Service for providing income and tax
data, and Philippe Thalmann for both useful comments and excellent research assistance.104 Goulder
folios. Gains also derive from effects on domestic saving. The withhold-
ing tax leads to only a temporary improvement in the U.S. trade balance
and in aggregate exports. The ultimate deterioration of the trade balance
is closely related to effects of the tax on international interest flows.
If foreign governments respond in kind to a U.S. withholding tax
initiative, the combined effect is a decline in U.S. residents' aggregate
welfare. Foreign retaliation enlarges the global efficiency losses associ-
ated with a new U.S. withholding tax.
The equity arguments for the withholding tax are mixed. Restricting
the application of the tax to investors from countries that already impose
similar measures may have more justification on fairness grounds than
applying the tax to all foreign investors. An attraction of the tax is its
ability to discourage capital flight to the U.S. and related tax evasion;
however, other policies with less serious efficiency costs might be
equally effective in addressing tax evasion problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades, the U.S. economy has become significantly
more open to international flows of financial capital. As a percent of
GNP, gross imports of financial capital—from foreigners' direct and
portfolio investments in the U.S.—rose from 0.5 percent in 1965 to 5.0
percent in 1985. These inflows have gradually but significantly altered
the pattern of capital ownership in the U.S.: while less than 3 percent of
U.S.-located capital was foreign-owned 20 years ago, today foreigners
own approximately 7.5 percent of the domestic capital stock.
These developments have given new impetus to discussions about the
appropriate tax treatment of foreign-owned capital. Much of the interest
income generated in this country now accrues to foreigners, adding
importance to the question as to whether such income should be subject
to U.S. taxation. Foreign income from U.S. sources has long been sub-
ject to a U.S. statutory 30 percent "withholding" tax. However, in July
1984, a major component of the tax was removed with the elimination of
withholding taxes on foreigners' interest income from U.S. sources. Re-
cent events have intensified the debate over whether the U.S. should
again include foreigners' interest income in the U.S. tax base.
Advocates of taxing foreigners' interest income emphasize that this
policy would help diminish the "twin deficits" problem now faced by
the U.S. The revenue raised by expanding the withholding tax would
help reduce the government budget deficit; at the same time, by dis-
couraging capital inflows, taxing foreigners' interest income would re-
duce the capital account imbalance and thereby help reduce the tradeImplications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 105
deficit. Discouraging capital inflows, it is argued, reduces demands for
dollar-denominated assets, helping to lower the exchange rate value of
the dollar and enhancing the international competitiveness of export-
oriented domestic industries.
Proponents also maintain that an expanded withholding tax would
alleviate problems of tax evasion and capital flight that are particularly
troubling for less developed countries. Many foreign individuals and
firms now invest in the U.S. in order to escape taxation at home; al-
though in many cases the income from such investments is officially
subject to taxation by the home country, such investments are difficult
to monitor and evasion is relatively easy. By reducing incentives to
invest in the U.S., it is argued, an expanded withholding tax would
discourage capital flight from many emerging nations and reduce tax
evasion.
Opponents of the policy initiative assert that a tax on foreigners' inter-
est income would in fact raise very little revenue. They point out that
bilateral treaties would oblige the U.S. to exempt capital income earned
by investors from several nations; they also indicate that even in cases
where the U.S. could apply the tax, there are many ways that investors
could rechannel their investments to escape taxation. Critics also argue
that the tax would curtail domestic capital formation. To attract foreign
investors, before-tax interest rates would have to rise (to offset the tax),
raising the cost of capital to domestic firms and reducing incentives to
invest in plant and equipment.
Many also worry that expanding the withholding tax would give rise
to retaliation by other governments, perhaps by way of similar with-
holding measures, and higher tax burdens on U.S. residents. Others
point out that the imposition of withholding taxes—whether by the U.S.
or other nations—constitutes an unfortunate departure from the resi-
dence principle of taxation according to which governments tax only
their own residents. Expanding the withholding tax represents a further
departure from this principle. These critics assert that abiding by the
residence principle is worthwhile because doing so not only avoids dou-
ble taxation but also tends to promote a more efficient international
allocation of resources.
This paper investigates these issues. The next section begins the in-
vestigation by providing some historical background; here the focus is
on the previous experience with withholding taxes in the U.S., although
some atttention is paid to West Germany's recent experience with such
taxes. Section III then provides a framework for evaluating the effects of
an expanded U.S. withholding tax. This framework guides the design
and interpretation of simulation experiments, reported in Section IV,206 Goulder
which allow for quantitative assessments of positive and normative ef-
fects of such a policy. The fifth section enlarges upon the previous
analysis by considering issues of international fairness and possibilities
for international policy coordination. The final section offers conclu-
sions.
II. PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH
WITHHOLDING TAXES
A. Statutory and Effective Rates in the U.S.
1
Prior to July 1984, the U.S. levied a 30 percent withholding tax on U.S.-
sourced income paid to non-resident aliens or foreign corporations. The
tax applied to several forms of portfolio income, including interest and
dividend income.
2 However, for several reasons the effective rate was
less than the statutory rate. First, several types of interest income were
exempt. Interest paid on deposits with domestic banks (including
certificates of deposit), savings and loan associations, and similar
financial institutions was exempt. The law also exempted interest paid
by U.S. corporations earning less than 20 percent of gross income from
sources within the U.S., interest paid by insurance companies, and the
original issue discount on instruments with a maturity of less than six
months (for example, short-term commercial paper and U.S. Treasury
bills).
A number of tax treaties further reduced the effective rate. Treaties
with 16 countries, including West Germamy and the United Kingdom,
assured that residents of these countries paid no U.S. withholding taxes.
Residents of 12 other nations faced withholding rates below the statu-
tory rate as a result of bilateral arrangements between their governments
and the U.S. government. Other treaty arrangements allowed rate re-
ductions for certain types of income that otherwise would have been
subject to the tax.
3
The revenue potential of the tax was further weakened as a conse-
quence of Internal Revenue Service rulings that enabled U.S. corporate
lenders to avoid the withholding tax by setting up finance subsidiaries in
1 This subsection draws significantly from Papke (1989), which examines the previous U.S.
experience in detail.
2 The tax does not apply to income directly connected with the taxpayer's conduct of trade
or business within the U.S. Such income is taxed separately and is treated as if it were
received by a U.S. citizen or corporation.
3 See Lewis (1986) for a detailed discussion of treaty arrangements, U.S.-sourced income
received, and withholding taxes paid by country.Implications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 107
the Netherlands Antilles.
4 The tax was typically avoided by the sub-
sidiary's issuing a Eurobond, free of tax, to a foreign investor, and then
funneling the bond revenues to the U.S. parent corporation. IRS rulings
in 1974 effectively authorized this practice, even though in these circum-
stances the subsidiary acted merely as a conduit for the parent. This
channel enabled investors from countries without favorable treaty ar-
rangements to purchase U.S. debt without facing the withholding tax.
5
By 1983, Eurobond issues through the Netherlands Antilles repre-
sented nearly all new U.S. corporate bond issues abroad. In that year,
interest payments to recipients in the Netherlands Antilles (on previ-
ously issued bonds) represented over 33 percent of total interest pay-
ments to foreigners. The importance of this tax-avoidance channel gives
credence to the comment that the U.S. treaty with the Netherlands
Antilles was a "one-way treaty with the world."
Thus, exemptions for certain types of securities, numerous treaty ar-
rangements, and one large loophole greatly eroded the base of U.S.
withholding tax. Table 1 shows income payments to foreigners and
taxes withheld during the period 1981-1986. Prior to July 1984, the statu-
tory rate on both interest and divided income was 30 percent. However,
the table indicates that from 1981 to 1983, the average tax rate on all
U.S.-sourced portfolio income ranges from 6.3 to 7.6 percent, far below
the statutory 30 percent rate. The rate on dividends (11.6-12.4 percent)
was higher than the rate on interest income (2.1-3.0 percent) during the
three-year period. The differences reflect the Netherlands Antilles tax-
avoidance option (which applied to interest) and the tendency of treaties
to specify larger rate reductions for interest payments.
In July 1984, the U.S. repealed the withholding tax on foreigners'
portfolio interest as part of the Deficit Reduction Act. The figures for
1985 in Table 1 indicate that the repeal had relatively little influence on
the effective tax rate on foreigners' interest income: most of this income
already could escape the tax before repeal. On the other hand, repeal
had two very significant effects on the method of issuing debt to for-
eigners. First, it led to a surge in direct sales of debt to non-residents.
Quarterly sales of U.S. bonds abroad never exceeded 0.3 billion from the
4 The Netherlands Antilles is a Caribbean nation comprising the six islands Aruba, Bon-
naire, Curacao, St. Maarten, St. Eustatius, and Saba.
5 Many investors from countries whose treaties with the U.S. would have enabled them to
avoid withholding still preferred the Eurobond market. This was the case because
Eurobonds could be purchased anonymously; in contrast, to escape withholding by di-
rectly purchasing a U.S. bond and taking advantage of favorable treaty terms required that
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first quarter of 1982 to the second quarter of 1984; in contrast, such sales
totaled $8.4 billion in the first quarter following repeal of the tax on
portfolio interest and have averaged more than $6 billion since then. The
second main effect was the complete elimination of the use of Nether-
lands Antilles finance subsidiaries to issue U.S. corporate debt.
6 This
complex tax-avoidance procedure was no longer necessary.
B. The Recent West German Experience
The U.S. experience reveals the substantial responsiveness of borrowers
to changes in international tax rules. Recent events in West Germany
also indicate a high degree of responsiveness to tax changes, in this case
displayed primarily by the lender side of the market. In the fall of 1987,
the West German government announced that a withholding tax on
interest income would go into effect in January 1989. The tax would
apply to both resident and non-resident investors in German bond mar-
kets. While German domestic bonds (including government bonds)
were subject to the tax, foreign securities, including foreign Deutsche-
mark bonds, were exempt. Both resident (West German) and non-
resident investors tended to shun the German market soon after the
announcement of the tax. In contrast, Deutschemark bonds issued by
foreign borrowers were much in demand. The February 1989 Report of
the Deutsche Bundesbank stated that the key factor behind the shift toward
the foreign bond market by domestic investors "was the fact that these
bonds are not subject to withholding tax on interest income." Foreign
investors also tended to shift toward the foreign bond market.
7
These shifts in demand were accompanied by changes in the interest
rate differentials between German bonds and other similar securities.
While the yield on German Federal bonds typically had been 0.25 to 0.5
percent below the yield on foreign Deutschemark bonds, rates on the
former securities rose above those on the foreign bonds beginning in
January 1988 (soon after the announcement of the withholding tax).
In April 1989, the German government announced that the withhold-
ing tax would be repealed beginning July 1, 1989.
8 The news was fol-
6 For details on these effects, see Papke (1989).
7 Demand for most types of German bonds sagged, with the exception of German domes-
tic bank bonds, most of which were purchased by German savings banks. Interest received
by savings banks were exempt from the withholding tax. For details, see Monthly Report of
the Deutsche Bundesbank 41 (2), February 1989.
8 In repealing the tax, the government adopted the position taken by the Deutsche Bun-
desbank and various industry groups that withholding had had serious adverse effects on
monetary policy and the capital market and therefore could no longer be defended. See
Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank for the Year 1988.220 Goulder
lowed by significant responses in both demands and interest rate
differentials. Both domestic and foreign investors appeared to shift their
portfolios toward the German domestic bond market. For example,
while foreign investors reduced their holdings of German public bonds
by 7.5 billion marks in the first three months of 1989, in April they took
up public bonds totaling more than 4 billion marks. The Deutsche Bun-
desbank attributed this change to the announced abolition of the with-
holding tax.
9 The changes were accompanied by changes in interest
differentials. In May 1989, the yield on German Federal bonds fell below
that on foreign Deutschemark bonds for the first time since December
1987.
C. Lessons and Revenue Implications
The U.S. and West German experiences yield a number of insights re-
garding the potential effects of prospective changes in the U.S. with-
holding tax. The U.S. experience brings out the degree to which
borrowers may alter financial practices in order to provide untaxed
financial instruments and thereby avoid the need to offer higher yields
to investors. In West Germany, tax avoidance was accomplished less by
firms' changing their methods of financing and more by lenders' shifting
away from the securities offered by German firms or banks.
Together, these experiences reveal a substantial potential for tax-
avoidance behavior on both sides of the market. The attractiveness of
expanding the withholding tax depends importantly on its revenue
yield, and if a U.S. tax on foreign interest is going to yield significant
revenues, the tax will have to be more difficult to escape than its prede-
cessor.
Could a U.S. withholding tax on foreigners' interest be implemented
in a way that yields significant revenues? Certainly in one important
respect, the revenue potential of the tax could be enhanced easily—by
proscribing the establishment of finance subsidiaries (in the Netherlands
Antilles or elsewhere) for the purpose of avoiding withholding. This
would not pose administrative problems, and would substantially
shrink, if not eliminate, an important loophole.
1
0
However, broadening the base of the tax might prove to be more
difficult. Extensive base broadening would require renegotiating exist-
9 See Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank 41 (7), July 1989.
1
0 It is unlikely that the prohibition could be made air-tight, given the difficulty of estab-
lishing whether the parent company's main reason for creating a given subsidiary was tax
avoidance.Implications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 111
ing treaties that exempt residents of certain countries from U.S. with-
holding. In view of the political costs of such initiatives, this may not be
a realistic option. The success of this option would also be dampened to
the extent that some foreigners reduced their tax obligations by setting
up "tax residences" in countries other than their main country of resi-
dence—namely, in countries with particularly advantageous treaties
with the U.S. This suggests that the revenue potential of a withholding
tax on foreigners' portfolio interest will be compromised so long as there
are a few countries whose treaties with the U.S. continue to offer their
residents particularly favorable withholding rates.
Another potential way to expand the revenue of the tax is to broaden
the domain of financial instruments covered by the tax. A main candi-
date for such broadening is interest on bank deposits. However, at-
tempts to broaden the tax in this way might encounter substantial
opposition. Some have questioned the advisability of extending the tax
to interest received on bank deposits in view of the fact that some depos-
itors are financial intermediaries, both lenders and borrowers. The claim
is that banks and other firms engaged in financial intermediation should
be given a tax deduction on interest paid to offset the tax on interest
received. It is argued that for such firms, a tax on gross interest amounts to
a tax on gross income and is effectively a tax on financial intermediation
itself. This is considered unfair to the intermediaries; only a tax on net
income is considered legitimate.
1
1 However, it might be difficult for the
U.S. to administer a tax that applies only to net interest. Many financial
intermediaries would claim interest deductions for payments made to
foreign investors, and such payments would be difficult for the U.S.
government to verify.
These considerations motivate some calculations of the potential addi-
tional revenues from expanding the withholding tax. First, suppose
withholding were expanded by introducing a tax on portfolio interest
with the same features (similar tax base, similar loopholes) as the port-
folio interest tax that applied prior to July 1984. Table 1 showed that the
effective rate on portfolio interest changed very little after repeal. In
1983, the effective rate was 2.1 percent; in 1985 and 1986, 2.0 percent. A
reasonable assumption is that resurrecting the type of interest withhold-
ing that applied prior to repeal would raise the effective rate by 0.1
percentage points; such an increase in the effective rate implies an addi-
tional $.02 billion for the year 1990, assuming gross portfolio interest
1
1 It may be noted that the West German withholding tax exempted "domestic bank
bonds," most of which were purchased by German savings banks.112 Goulder
payments to foreigners in 1990 of $20.9 billion.
1
2 Alternatively, one
might project the revenue effects by assuming that the extension of
withholding restores the average rate on all U.S. source portfolio income
to the rate which applied prior to repeal. This alternative approach sug-
gests that extending the withholding tax would imply an additional $.2
billion for the year 1990.
1
3 These simple calculations suggest that an
interest withholding tax of the type that applied prior to July 1984 would
not yield significant revenues. Moreover, these calculations probably
overstate the net revenue effect from such an expansion of the tax: to the
extent that the tax on interest income induces a rise in before-tax U.S.
interest rates, it raises the value of interest deductions from the U.S.
corporate income tax, implying an offsetting revenue loss.
1
4
Some simple further calculations give a rough idea of the potential
additional revenues that might be generated by removing loopholes and
broadening the base of the portfolio interest tax. These calculations will
be crude in that they will assume the tax does not alter the level and
composition of gross income payments to foreigners.
1
5 The implications
of removing the Netherlands Antilles loophole can be gauged by raising
the effective rate to Netherlands Antilles recipients from 0.44 percent—
the effective rate on income to recipients in this country in 1983—to 7.69
percent—the average effective rate to recipients from other countries.
1
6
Doing so implies additional revenues of $0.49 billion. The effects of
removing the favorable provisions of treaties can be assessed in similar
fashion: by replacing the 1983 average effective rate to treaty countries
(7.50 percent) with the average rate that applied to non-treaty countries
1
2 The value of 1990 interest payments to foreigners was projected from the actual pay-
ments level in 1987 assuming an annual growth rate of 22.5 percent, the average annual
rate over the period 1981-1987.
1
3 This alternative approach assumes that the composition of foreigners' holdings of U.S.
assets would be the same after reintroducing interest withholding as it was in 1983 (prior
to repeal). In 1983, the average effective withholding tax rate (Table 1) was 6.3 percent; in
1987, the most recent year for which such data are available, the average effective rate was
5.7 percent. If restoring interest withholding raised the overall rate by 0.6 percentage
points in 1990, it would thereby generate $0.2 billion, assuming gross income payments to
foreigners in 1990 of $35.1 billion. The 1990 gross income figure was projected from the
actual payments level in 1987 assuming an annual growth rate of 15.5 percent, the average
annual rate over the period 1981-1987.
1
4 See Brean (1984) for an examination of this issue.
1
5 These calculations probably overstate potential additional revenues, since agents are
likely to alter savings instruments and shift methods of financing in order to reduce their
tax obligations.
1
6 Figures for average withholding tax rates for different countries were obtained from
Carson (1985). Withholding by foreign governments or foreign withholding agents is not
considered.Implications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 113
(10.01 percent). This implies additional revenues of $0.96 billion.
1
7 Fi-
nally, withholding interest payments on bank deposits could bring in
further revenues. Applying an effective rate of 30 percent to estimated
U.S. bank deposit interest to non-bank foreigners in 1990 implies an
additional $3.1 billion in revenues.
1
8
Thus, these crude calculations suggest that expanding the with-
holding tax might raise from $0.02 to $4.75 billion in additional an-
nual revenues, depending on the extent of loophole-closing and base-
broadening. Bank deposits appear to represent the largest potential
source of new revenues.
Of course, the revenue potential of an expanded withholding tax is
only one of several important considerations relevant to assessing the
effects of the policy option on economic well-being. The next section
brings out other critical considerations.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING
WITHHOLDING TAXES
This section presents a framework for analyzing potential effects of
changes in withholding taxes on the domestic economy. The focus is on
domestic welfare.
We begin with the case that is simplest to analyze: here we abstract
from the possibility of U.S. market power in world capital markets and
from pre-existing taxes on domestic saving or domestic investment. We
also abstract from the presence of tax credits offered by foreign govern-
ments and from the possibility of retaliation (for example, imposing new
taxes on U.S. residents' investments abroad) by foreign governments.
Subsection B below extends the analysis to consider these compli-
cations.
A. The Simplest Case
In the simple case considered here, the U.S. is regarded as a price taker
in international markets for financial capital. In Figure 1, the horizontal
line Spi represents the original supply curve of financial capital; in keep-
ing with the price-taker assumption, the supply is perfectly elastic at the
1
7 To avoid double-counting, the additional income is calculated by employing an adjusted
average rate for treaty countries. This rate is calculated after adjusting taxes paid by
Netherlands Antilles recipients to incorporate the assumption that the finance subsidiary
loophole had been removed.
1
8 Gross interest payments on bank deposits were projected from data on demand and
time deposits of non-bank foreigners published in the 1985 Treasury Bulletin. An interest





FIGURE 1. Effects of Withholding Taxes: The Simplest Case
world interest rate r\. The downward and upward sloping lines repre-
sent the marginal product of capital (MPC) and opportunity cost of
saving (OCS) as functions of the levels of domestic investment and
domestic saving, respectively.
1
9 In the absence of a withholding tax and
of other taxes, equilibrium in the capital market is established with do-
mestic saving equal to SD1, domestic investment equal to IDI, and im-
ports of capital equal to 7Di ~ SDI-
If the U.S. alters this environment by imposing a withholding tax, the
pre-tax return offered to foreign investors must rise to r2 = ri/(l — tw),
where tw is the withholding tax rate; the increase in the pre-tax return is
necessary to make the after-tax return to foreign investors comparable to
the return these investors could obtain elsewhere. Thus, the foreign
supply curve rises to Sp2- The higher gross rate reduces investment
demands to ID2 and stimulates a higher level of domestic saving, SD2.
2
0
Hence imports of financial capital fall.
1
9 It is not necessary to specify the time frame for the saving and investment schedules
employed here. What is critical is that OCS and MPC respectively take into account all
future consumption alternatives and the productiveness of a current investment over all
future points in time.
2
0 We assume here that U.S. firms are unable to discriminate between domestic and
foreign lenders when they issue securities. Thus, the higher gross return must be offered
to both classes of lenders. This assumption seems well substantiated by empirical
observation.
This partial equilibrium analysis assumes that increases in the after-tax interest rate
bring about a higher volume of saving. In general equilibrium, this need not be the caseImplications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 115
The tax has the following welfare effects. The higher returns offered to
domestic savers yield a welfare gain to these savers which is represented
by the area A. Domestic firms face higher costs of borrowing, and suffer
a welfare loss represented by regions A, B, C, and D taken together. The
revenues collected by the tax yield a gain to taxpayers which is repre-
sented by C.
2
1 In the aggregate, the tax yields a domestic welfare loss of
B + D. B is the dead-weight loss associated with the domestic econo-
my's having to finance SD2 ~ SDi of domestic investments at a rate
higher than the world interest rate, rlf and yet not collecting any with-
holding tax on these investments. D is the dead-weight loss associated
with no longer undertaking marginal investments 7Di - ID2/ whose re-
turns exceed the world interest rate.
This initial, simple analysis indicates that if the U.S. is a price taker in
international capital markets and if one abstracts from possible compli-
cations posed by foreign tax credits and other taxes, then imposing a
withholding tax will not improve aggregate domestic welfare. The anal-
ysis here is similar to that which applies to the introduction of an import
tariff in an economy that is a price taker in commodity markets. Of
course, the withholding tax redistributes wealth and welfare, and this
enables some agents—for example, savers and taxpayers—to gain. And
certain U.S. industries may benefit (in terms of profitability or sales)
from the tax change. Export-oriented industries, in particular, may gain.
The reduction in capital imports occasioned by the tax reduces demands
for dollar-denominated assets and thus tends to make the dollar cheaper
in international exchange markets. This will tend to benefit domestic
industries oriented toward the export market, at least initially.
2
2
(see, for example, Bovenberg (1989a)). Possibilities of shifts in the saving schedule as a
result of general equilibrium effects do not alter the aggregate welfare analysis presented
here.
2
1 The taxpayer's gain may occur in one of two ways. The tax revenues may permit the
government to maintain the same real expenditure while lowering other taxes by the
amount raised by the withholding tax. Alternatively, the government may use the reve-
nues to provide additional goods and services valued by taxpayers. In this latter case, C
accurately represents the welfare gain to taxpayers only if the value to them of a dollar of
additional public expenditure equals the value to them of a dollar of private expenditure. If
the government is inefficient in its use of tax revenues, the gains to taxpayers will be
lower, but the essential aggregate welfare conclusions from the analysis do not change.
2
2 Because the withholding tax reduces domestic investment, the policy ultimately implies
a lower capital stock than otherwise would be the case. Over the longer term, the lower
stock may imply reduced real incomes and reduced demands for the products of all
industries, including export-oriented industries. Using a dynamic simulation model, Goul-
der and Eichengreen (1989a) and Bovenberg and Goulder (1989) find that, because of
capital accumulation effects, investment-oriented policies have opposite implications for
the output and profitability of export industries in the short and long run.226 Goulder
B. Complications
1. U.S. Market Power. The above analysis assumed that the U.S. is a
small actor in world financial markets. This clearly is not the case. In
1988, securities issued by the U.S. amounted to $47.2 billion, approxi-
mately 14.3 percent of the total value of securities issued by the OECD
nations.
2
3 This large share of the supply side of the market suggests
considerable monopsony power: changes in U.S. demands for investible
funds (supplies of securities) are likely to have a significant effect on
world interest rates.
The large market share is not the only potential source of market
power. Such power also arises if foreign investors cannot perfectly sub-
stitute securities issued by the U.S. for foreign securities. Under these
circumstances, foreign interest rates and the U.S. rate (after withhold-
ing) will not be brought to equality following the introduction of a with-
holding tax: investors will not sufficiently shift toward foreign securities
to drive the foreign rate down to match the U.S. rate net of withholding.
Hence imperfect substitutability also grants market power to the U.S.
because it allows the withholding tax to drive down U.S. interest rates
(after withholding). In the extreme case where foreign investors cannot
substitute foreign securities for U.S. securities to any degree, the with-
holding tax need not cause pre-tax rates to rise at all: that is, the after-tax
rate can fall by the full amount of the tax without causing any reduction
in the supply of foreign funds to the U.S.
2
4
For a nation with the power to influence after-tax interest rates, it is no
longer the case that a withholding tax will necessarily reduce aggregate
welfare. As shown in the appendix, the aggregate welfare effects now
must take account of the effects of withholding on the domestic after-tax
rate and the foreign interest rate. The larger is a nation's share of the
world capital market, the greater its ability to drive down interest rates.
If the nation is a net capital importer, reduced interest rates tend to
reduce the costs of net capital imports. This implies a welfare benefit
that to some degree will offset the adverse aggregate welfare effects of
introducing withholding. In contrast, for a net capital exporting country,
larger market share tends to reduce the attractiveness of withholding by
reducing the returns from net capital exports.
Imperfect substitutability generally makes withholding more attrac-
2
3 This information was obtained from OECD Financial Statistics, Part 1, Financial Statistics
Monthly, January 1989.
2
4 This abstracts from income effects. By reducing foreigners' incomes, the withholding tax
could depress the overall level of foreign saving and thereby exert some compensating
upward influence on world interest rates.Implications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 117
tive. This is the case because it generally allows the domestic after-tax
interest rate—the rate paid to import capital—to fall by more than
the world interest rate—the rate received on exported capital. Thus, the
lower the substitutability between domestic and foreign securities, the




2. Foreign Tax Credits. The tax systems of many nations include provi-
sions which would permit their residents to credit withholding taxes
paid to the U.S. against tax obligations to the foreign government. In-
deed, all of the OECD nations offer some type of credit for taxes paid by
their residents to other governments, although in many cases the credit
provisions are rather restrictive.
The presence of foreign tax credits can substantially alter the effects of
U.S. withholding taxes. If marginal foreign investors in the U.S. are
eligible for full crediting of the withholding tax, then imposing the tax in
the U.S. will lead to no change in the pretax rate of return offered on
U.S. securities. The tax payment to the U.S. government in this case is
fully offset by a lowered tax liability to the relevant foreign government.
The overall return to the foreign investor (net of U.S. and foreign taxes)
is unchanged.
Under these circumstances, the withholding tax would have no first-
order effect on domestic pre-tax interest rates or on the level of domestic
saving and investment. What the tax accomplishes is a transfer of reve-
nues from foreign nations to the U.S. If one believes that foreign govern-
ments would not respond to this U.S. initiative by imposing similar
withholding taxes on U.S. investors, then the U.S. withholding tax ap-
pears quite attractive from the point of view of domestic welfare.
However, it is important to note that these results obtain only if the
marginal foreign investor is eligible for the tax credit. Even if a large
number of investors in U.S. securities can take advantage of the credit, if
the marginal investor cannot, then domestic borrowers will need to
increase pre-tax interest rates to attract the necessary additional lenders.
In this case, introducing U.S. withholding directly affects the equilib-
rium in the domestic loanable funds markets, as in the cases previously
described.
3. Pre-existing Taxes on Domestic Saving or Domestic Investment. The
previous analysis abstracted from important prior taxes on domestic
2
5 As indicated in the appendix, evaluating the welfare implications of lower asset substi-
tutability also requires consideration of the effects of lower substitutability on the levels of
capital imports and exports.118 Goulder
saving and investment. The U.S. individual income tax drives a wedge
between the gross and net return to saving by domestic households. The
U.S. corporation income tax (including depreciation provisions) imposes




In the presence of these other taxes, introducing a withholding tax
may have quite different welfare implications from those originally
derived. Prior taxes influence both the aggregate welfare impact and the
distribution of the gains and losses. As shown in the appendix, the
implications of prior saving taxes are different from those of prior taxes
on investment. Prior taxes on (subsidies to) saving exert a positive
(negative) influence on the net welfare impact of a withholding tax. To
the extent that a withholding tax raises interest rates to domestic savers,
it may stimulate additional domestic saving. This enables the saving tax
to bring in more revenue. The additional revenue from the saving tax
corresponds to a welfare gain. The welfare benefit occurs because taxes
on saving cause the marginal social opportunity cost of a given level of
saving to fall below the marginal social benefits (private return plus
value of taxes) associated with that level of saving: at the margin, a unit
of saving is worth more to individuals and taxpayers than its cost in
terms of foregone consumption. Hence, there are welfare gains that
stem from the increase in domestic saving induced by the withholding
tax.
Similar considerations indicate that prior taxes on (subsidies to) in-
vestment reduce (increase) the appeal of withholding. Higher interest
rates from the imposition of withholding tend to discourage domestic
investment. In the presence of investment taxes, the decline in invest-
ment implies an additional welfare loss because, with such taxes, the
marginal social benefit from investment exceeds its marginal social cost.
Saving and investment taxes alter the distributional implications of a
withholding tax by changing the relative magnitudes of domestic saving
and investment in the initial equilibrium prior to the introduction of
withholding.
4. Substitutions between Taxed and Untaxed U.S. Securities. As indi-
cated in Section II, it is unlikely that any practicable U.S. withholding tax
would effectively cover all U.S. securities. Assets might escape the tax
2
6 For a detailed discussion of these "wedges," see King and Fullerton (1984). Sinn (1988)
analyzes these issues in an open-economy context. Accelerated depreciation and other
favorable tax provisions applied to investment raise the possibility that the overall wedge
posed by investment-side tax policies may be negative (see Sinn [1988]).Implications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 119
by substitution activities undertaken by either borrowers or lenders. The
use of Netherlands Antilles finance subsidiaries represented borrowers'
substituting one financing channel for another in order to avoid the tax.
Foreign investors' substituting untaxed U.S. certificates of deposit for
taxed corporate bonds exemplifies a tax-avoidance response on the
lender side of the market. Either type of substitution implies lower effec-
tive withholding tax rate than that employed in the previous analysis. In
the polar case of perfect substitutability, the effective rate is zero: the
introduction of the tax precipitates a complete switching to untaxed
securities, so there is no first-order change in the equilibrium levels of
domestic saving or investment.
How much substitution is possible? This depends both on the design
of the tax and on preferences. Tax legislation might proscribe the use of
alternative financing channels (as in the Netherland Antilles case) to
avoid tax. However, unless the tax covers all financial assets, lender-side
substitution is inevitable.
C. Divining the Overall Effects in a Complicated
Environment
The different "complications" considered above make it difficult to as-
sess a priori the effects of a new withholding tax. Table 2 summarizes the
ways these different dimensions of the economic environment influence
the welfare analysis. As the table makes clear, some of these complica-
tions—namely, U.S. market power and prior taxes on saving—tend to
exert positive influences on welfare, offsetting the negative overall im-
pacts implied by the original "simplest case" analysis and the negative
influence of prior investment taxes. Thus, in a complex environment,
the overall impact of a withholding tax is analytically ambiguous. The
overall impact depends on the relative importance of the often con-
tradictory forces at work.
Ascertaining the overall effects requires a quantitative analysis: data
and behavioral parameters have to be supplied. The next section dis-
cusses the design and results of a quantitative approach intended to
shed further light on welfare and other effects of a new withholding tax.
IV. SIMULATIONS
A. The Model
The simulation results described here derive from a simulation model of
the U.S. and the "rest of the world." The model is general equilibrium in
nature, accounting for interactions among labor, capital, and goods mar-






U.S. Power in Financial
Markets
—large share of world
transactions
—imperfect substitutability be-
tween domestic and foreign
securities
Tax Credits Offered by Foreign
Governments
—marginal investor fully eligible
for credit
—marginal investor not fully eli-
gible for credit
Pre-existing Taxes on Domestic Sav-
ing or Investment
Substitution between Taxed and Un-
taxed U.S. Securities
enables withholding tax (WHT) to cause
reduction in domestic and foreign in-
terest rates; makes WHT more (less) at-
tractive if U.S. is net importer
(exporter) of capital.
enables WHT to induce reduction in do-
mestic interest rate relative to foreign
rate; makes WHT more attractive
enable WHT to transfer funds from for-
eign to domestic treasuries; imply
WHT has no first-order effect on do-
mestic saving or investment
enable WHT to transfer funds from for-
eign to domestic treasuries; imply
WHT has some effect on domestic sav-
ing and investment
prior saving taxes expand potential of
WHT to generate welfare gains; prior
investment taxes reduce this potential
implies lower effective withholding tax
rate
the U.S. economy by paying close attention to U.S. international trade in
commodities and in financial capital.
The model's structure and data are fully described in Goulder and
Eichengreen (1989b). Here we offer only a brief description of the model,
emphasizing the features most relevant to analyzing withholding taxes.
The production side of the model distinguishes ten U.S. industries
and one foreign industry. At each point in time, domestic and foreign
producers combine cost-minimizing levels of labor and intermediate in-
puts with the existing capital stock. Intermediate inputs can be obtained
both at home and abroad, and firms choose the mix of domestic and
foreign inputs that minimizes costs.
Industry capital stocks evolve over time as a result of managers' for-
ward-looking investment strategies aimed at maximizing the value of
the firm. Optimal investment involves balancing the costs of new capitalImplications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 121
(both the acquisition costs and the adjustment costs associated with
installation) against the benefits in terms of the higher gross profits
made possible by a larger capital stock.
2
7 Investments are financed
through retained earnings and new issues of debt and equity. Managers
have perfect-foresight expectations; thus their investment decisions take
account of future prices and interest rates as well as current conditions.
The consumption side of the model includes a representative domes-
tic household and a representative foreign household. Each household
makes consumption and portfolio decisions to maximize utility. Like
producers, households are forward-looking (with perfect foresight), bas-
ing their decisions on future as well as current prices and interest rates.
The model takes account of international cross-ownership of financial
assets. Portfolios of foreign households, for example, generally consist
of both foreign and U.S. stocks and bonds. Similarly for U.S. house-
holds.
Households' portfolio decisions include choosing the shares of do-
mestic and foreign assets in their financial wealth. When relative rates of
return offered on domestic and foreign assets change, households ad-
just their portfolios to increase the share of portfolios represented by
assets whose relative returns have increased. For a given household,
overall consumption at each point in time is a composite of specific
consumption good types which in turn are composites of domestically-
produced and foreign-made goods of each type. When the relative
prices of domestic and foreign consumer goods change, households
alter the proportions of domestic and foreign consumer goods making
up each composite in accordance with utility maximization.
Household labor supply is exogenous. Households supply labor only
to firms in the country of residence: labor is internationally immobile.
However, labor is perfectly mobile across industries within a country.
The model also incorporates a government sector in both the domestic
and foreign economies. Each government collects taxes, distributes
transfers, purchases goods and services, and faces a budget constraint
according to which revenues and expenditures must balance in each
year.
The requirements of equilibrium are that in each country and in each
period of time: (1) the demand for labor equals its supply, (2) the de-
mand for output from each industry equals its supply, (3) total external
borrowing by firms equal total saving by residents of the given country
2
7 The model adopts the asset price approach to investment of Summers (1981), which
incorporates considerations of adjustment costs within a q-theoretic firm-value-
maximizing investment framework.122 Goulder
plus the net capital inflow, and (4) government revenues equal govern-
ment spending. Equilibrium is established through adjustments in the
nominal exchange rate,
2
8 in domestic and foreign output prices, in do-
mestic and foreign interest rates, and in lump-sum adjustments to do-
mestic and foreign personal taxes.
New policies lead to changes in prices, interest rates, and asset values
in the U.S. and abroad. Such changes induce households to alter their
expenditure patterns and their portfolios. Through adjustments in asset
prices, interest rates, and exchange rates, a new equilibrium is estab-
lished in which asset, commodity, and factor supplies and demands are
in balance.
B. The Experiments
We consider two main policy changes. The first is the unilateral in-
troduction by the U.S. of a 30 percent withholding tax on foreigners'
portfolio interest; the second is the introduction of such a tax accom-
panied by a similar 30 percent tax adopted by foreign governments. The
previous section indicated several factors which condition the effects of
a withholding tax. These factors are addressed in the following "central
case" assumptions (which are altered in subsequent sensitivity
analysis):
1. U.S. Power in Financial Markets. This depends on the U.S. share of
world financial capital and the substitutability of U.S. and foreign assets.
The simulations assume that the U.S. initially (prior to the policy
change) issues 30 percent of securities issued worldwide. The elasticity
of substitution between U.S. and foreign assets in portfolios is assumed
to be unity.
2. Tax Credits Provided by Foreign Governments. Marginal investors
are assumed to be ineligible for such credits. However, the credits do
apply to inframarginal investments (and give rise to international reve-
nue transfers). Credits are assumed to apply to 60 percent of the value of
taxes withheld.
3. Pre-existing Taxes. The model incorporates detailed aspects of the
U.S. tax system. The "foreign tax system" has the same structure as that
in the U.S., although its tax rates generally differ from the U.S.
counterparts.
2
8 The number of equilibrating "prices" is one less than the number of equilibrium condi-
tions, as one of the equilibrium conditions is redundant from Walras's Law. Both domestic
and foreign nominal wages are fixed in their respective currencies. The exchange rate
variable permits the relative prices of domestic and foreign labor to vary.Implications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 123
4. Substitutions between Taxed and Untaxed U.S. Securities. The mod-
el's capabilities for evaluating withholding taxes are weakest with re-
spect to this issue. Although it represents corporate stocks and bonds
explicitly, the model does not explicitly deal with bank deposits or
financial intermediation. Thus it cannot explicitly capture substitutions
between such deposits and other assets. Nor does the model directly
consider borrower-side tax avoidance through establishment of sub-
sidiaries in tax-haven countries. These issues are addressed primitively
and indirectly through the assumption that the effective withholding tax
rate is 75 percent of the statutory rate.
C. Results
1. Unilateral Withholding Tax. Table 3 displays some principal mac-
roeconomic effects from these simulations. We begin with the effects of
a U.S. withholding tax initiative unaccompanied by foreign retaliation.
a. Macroeconomic effects. The U.S. withholding tax tends to generate an
increase in U.S. saving (and consumption) and a decline in foreign sav-
ing (and consumption). This partly reflects the fact that the policy
change raises permanent income of domestic residents and reduces the
permanent income of foreigners (discussed in b below). At the same
time, the policy change induces foreigners to devote larger shares of
their portfolios to foreign, rather than U.S., assets. Thus, changes in
both the levels and composition of saving imply a deterioration of the
U.S. capital account balance. In the base (or status quo) case, the capital
account balance is zero. The policy change implies capital account
deficits.
The reduction in foreign demand for U.S. assets has two direct conse-
quences. First, it promotes increases in the U.S. before-tax interest rate.
This is shown in Figure 2a, which compares the paths of this interest
rate under the policy change with its (constant) path in the base case.
The second direct effect is a reduction in the exchange rate value of the
dollar; this leads to a parallel reduction in the real exchange rate (price
index of domestic goods divided by the price index of foreign goods).
The capital account deficit must be financed by a surplus on the cur-
rent account, whose components are the trade balance and the net inter-
est receipts from abroad. The policy change reduces the value of interest
paid to foreigners; net interest receipts are positive immediately follow-
ing the policy change. However, in the short run, the improvement in
this component of the current account is not sufficient to finance the
capital account deficit; hence the U.S. must run a trade surplus. How-
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FIGURE 2. Dynamic Effects of Withholding Taxes
flows from abroad continue to rise both absolutely and relative to GDP.
After a few years, this permits the U.S. trade balance to switch to a
deficit, as indicated in Figure 2b. Thus the effects of the withholding
initiative on the trade balance change dramatically over time.
On impact, the policy change improves the net foreign asset position
of the U.S.—the value of U.S.-owned assets located abroad relative toImplications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 127
foreign-owned assets located in the U.S. This occurs because the with-
holding tax significantly reduces the after-tax value of foreigners' hold-
ings of U.S. assets. The improvement in the U.S. asset position also




By raising U.S. pre-tax rates relative to foreign rates, the policy change
reduces the rate of domestic investment relative to foreign investment.
Over time, this reduces the relative supply of U.S. goods, and tends to
raise their relative price, as indicated by the gradual increase in the real
exchange rate (after its initial drop). These exchange rate movements
help to bring about the necessary changes in the trade balance. They
also imply reductions (relative to the base case path) in aggregate real
exports in the long run (Figure 2c).
b. Welfare effects. The bottom rows of Table 3 display welfare effects.
The policy initiative raises aggregate domestic welfare; this suggests that
the positive welfare effects associated with market power and (in the
presence of prior saving taxes) increased domestic saving are strong
enough to offset the distortionary costs of the policy. Foreigners suffer a
decline in welfare. Global welfare—here defined as the sum of the dol-
lar-equivalent welfare changes to domestic and foreign residents—also
declines, suggesting that the policy change reduces the global efficiency
of resource allocation. (Section V below offers explanations for the global
efficiency effects.)
2. U.S. Tax with Foreign Retaliation. The right-hand columns of Table 3
display results under the assumption that the U.S. policy move induces
foreigners to respond in kind. The effects in this case are quite different.
The symmetric aspect of the two policies implies much smaller changes
in the trade balance and other components of the balance of payments.
Accordingly, the changes in nominal and real exchange rates are small.
While net flows show little change, gross international flows change
substantially. Because the changes in gross flows largely offset each
other, there is relatively little change in available funds to U.S. firms,
and before-tax U.S. interest rates change very little.
Global imposition of withholding leads to significant changes in wel-
fare. As indicated in Table 3, aggregate domestic as well as foreign
welfare decline. A comparison of the results in the two alternative exper-
2
9 A nation's current account is the change in its net foreign asset position. This relation-
ship implies that the present value of a nation's prospective trade balances must equal the
negative of its current net foreign asset position. Thus, when the net foreign asset position
improves, the trade balance can be lower on average.128 Goulder
iments makes clear that from the point of domestic welfare, the attrac-
tiveness of the withholding tax option depends fundamentally on the
extent to which it induces foreign retaliation.
3. Sensitivity Analysis. Table 4 shows the sensitivity of results to
changes in key parameters. As predicted, lower asset substitutability
increases U.S. financial market power, enabling U.S. capital markets to
clear with smaller increases in before-tax interest rates. Greater U.S.
market power implies lower foreign welfare. The extent of (inframar-






































































































"SR" and "LR" denote the first period following the policy change and the new steady state. The status
quo or base case value for the domestic interest rate is 7.56 percent, except in the "no-prior-taxes"
experiment, for which the base case interest rate is 5.587 percent. In the central case, the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and foreign assets in the foreigner's portfolio preference function is
unity, the foreign government offers tax credits to foreigners for 60 percent of the value of withholding
taxes paid to the U.S., the marginal foreign investor is assumed to be ineligible for tax credits, and the
statutory withholding tax rate is 30 percent. The low and high asset substitutability cases assume values
of 0.5 and 4.0 for the asset substitution parameter. In the restricted and extended tax credit cases, 30
percent and 90 percent of the value of withholding taxes paid are eligible for tax credits. In the case
where the marginal foreign investor is eligible for credits, still only 60 percent of (inframarginal)
withholding taxes paid are offset by foreign tax credits.Implications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 129
est rates. Foreign residents' welfare improves slightly with more
extensive credits.
3
0 Treating the marginal foreign investor as eligible for
the credits leads to significantly different initial interest rate effects, as
expected: the U.S. interest rate need not rise much, since under these
circumstances the withholding tax has no first-order effect on the after-
tax return to the foreign investor. Here the withholding tax does little to
deter foreign investment in the U.S.; hence no serious capital account
deficit arises, and the nation can afford to run a trade deficit, even in the
short term.
3
1 A simulation performed under the counterfactual
specification of no prior taxes on domestic saving and investment leads
to smaller welfare gains from withholding. This suggests that, in the
presence of saving and investment taxes, the gains from withholding-
tax-induced increases in domestic saving outweigh the losses from in-
duced reductions in domestic investment. Finally, the pattern of interest
rate, trade balance, and welfare effects is essentially the same under
different statutory withholding rates, although magnitudes differ.
The sensitivity analysis shows that two main results from these exper-
iments are robust. In all experiments, the policy change ultimately wors-
ens the trade balance. In addition, the unilateral initiative considered
here consistently leads to domestic welfare gains. Still, these results
should be interpreted with caution. Results are sensitive to assumptions
about the extent of asset substitutability, and very high values could
reverse the sign of the welfare effect.
3
2 In addition, the lack of an explicit
treatment of banking institutions and other financial intermediation is a
significant limitation in evaluating this withholding initiative. It should
also be kept in mind that all simulations assume balanced budgets on
the part of the U.S. and foreign governments: revenue-expenditure bal-
ance is maintained through lump-sum tax adjustments. Hence these
experiments do not account for possible welfare effects associated with
the withholding tax's ability to alter public sector budget imbalances (the
U.S. budget deficit in particular). These results should be regarded as
suggestive rather than definitive.
3
0 One might expect higher credits to imply lower foreign welfare. In the model, the
potentially adverse effects of higher credits are minimized because the credits are financed
through lump-sum taxes, which have no direct adverse efficiency consequences.
3
1 The trade balance is slightly positive in year 1 but is negative in all subsequent years.
3
2 For technical reasons, we were unable to employ values larger than 4.0 for the asset
substitutability parameter. Employing very large values currently leads to instability in the
algorithm used to solve for economic equilibria. One hopes that a technical breakthrough
is not far away.230 Goulder
V. ADOPTING A MORE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
The approach taken in the last two sections to evaluate the withholding
tax option might be considered narrow in at least two respects. First, it
employed a somewhat restrictive notion of U.S. welfare. Considerations
of international fairness, of the good (or bad) will stemming from per-
ceptions of fairness (or inequity), and of the global efficiency of resource
allocation were omitted from the previous assessments of the tax.
Second, the previous sections evaluated the policy option only in
comparison with the status quo, whereas a broader examination might
expand the domain of alternatives to include coordinated policy initia-
tives undertaken cooperatively by the U.S. and other nations. Such
initiatives might lead to more favorable outcomes (domestically and
globally) than the non-cooperative policy actions scrutinized thus far.
This section takes a broader perspective, investigating some issues that
may be critical to the overall attractiveness of the withholding tax
option.
A. A Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Policy or a Quid-Pro-Quo
Response?
The simulation results from the previous section indicate that a unilat-
eral withholding tax would generate welfare losses to foreigners that
largely offset the domestic welfare gains. It is hard to justify unilateral
introduction of the tax on the grounds of global efficiency, since the
reductions in foreign wealth and welfare match the domestic gains. The
unilateral policy has an unappealing beggar-thy-neighbor quality.
The initiative gains some appeal to the extent that it is applied selec-
tively, only to residents of those countries that already impose similar levies on
the interest income of U.S. residents. A selective withholding tax seems less
unfair. Table 5 shows the withholding taxes that 25 (mainly industri-
alized) countries apply to income earned from U.S. portfolio invest-
ments in those countries. The table reveals considerable variation in the
treatment of interest income. Three of the nations offer a blanket exemp-
tion for interest income. Nine others exempt such income as a result of
treaties with the U.S. Twelve countries tax interest income at rates of ten
percent or higher. The table suggests that if a U.S. tax on foreigners'
portfolio interest were imposed selectively, it might apply to about half
of the major nations involved in international financial transactions with
the U.S.
B. Global Efficiency
However, whether or not it is imposed selectively, a withholding tax on
interest income is not attractive in terms of the global efficiency of capitalImplications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 131
TABLE 5
Foreign Withholding Rates on U.S.-Owned Capital Under U.S. Income















































































































E, The income is exempt from withholding tax under the treaty. N/A, The treaty does not limit the tax
applicable to this type of income.
Note: Rates apply to both individual and corporate investors. Source of data is Ernst & Whinney, 1988
Foreign and U.S. Corporate Income and Withholding Tax Rates.
allocation. The policy experiments described in the previous section
attest to this result: for example, simulations of a unilateral expansion of
the U.S. withholding tax led to no increase in global welfare. A reason
for the global inefficiency of the withholding tax is that it departs from
the residence principle of taxation, which has some desirable efficiency
properties. When taxed on a residence basis, households pay taxes on
their worldwide income, and their tax obligations are to the govern-
ments of their country of residence. Universal adoption of the residence132 Goulder
principle in the taxation of capital income tends to promote a more
efficient global allocation of capital by inducing equality of pre-tax rates
of return on capital, even when nations' tax rates differ.
3
3
The withholding tax does not adhere to the residence principle. The
tax is source-based: an individual's withholding tax obligations are to the
country in which the income is generated, not the country of residence.
When nations impose different tax rates, source-based taxation cannot
be relied upon to produce a globally efficient allocation of capital: pre-tax
returns will generally not be equated. Introducing withholding taxes
leads tax systems away from the residence principle and is likely to
imply a reduction in the global efficiency of capital allocation. This ad-
verse effect is mitigated to the extent that foreign governments allow
their residents to credit withholding taxes paid to the U.S.
3
4
A second major reason for the global efficiency losses has to do with
the changes in the overall level of capital taxation brought about by
expanding the withholding tax. While the previous discussion of resi-
dence-based taxation was linked to the efficiency in the static interna-
tional allocation of capital, the issue of the overall level of capital taxation
bears on the efficiency in the intertemporal allocation of capital. Insofar as
they raise the overall level of capital taxation, expanded withholding
taxes may reduce the intertemporal efficiency of resource allocation,
leading to lower levels of saving and investment than that which would
maximize welfare over time.
3
5 In the simulations reported in the previ-
ous section, the expanded withholding tax did indeed augment the
overall level of capital taxation because the additional taxes were not
3
3 See Bovenberg (1989b), Giovannini (1989), and Mintz (1986) for a discussion of the
efficiency of residence-based (and source-based) taxation. Although universal adoption of
residence-based taxation may yield a "neutral" tax environment in the sense that pre-tax
rates of return are equal across countries and industries, if consumption-side taxes are not
optimal or if different types of capital goods are not equally complementary to labor in
production, neutrality of this type is generally sub-optimal. On this point see Auerbach
(1988). Furthermore, multinational firms introduce complications, and residence-based
taxation of such firms cannot guarantee production efficiency (see Mintz [1986]).
It may be noted that the OECD, in its 1977 Model Double Taxation Convention on
Income and on Capital, endorsed the residence principle for interest income flows as a rule
for double taxation treaties.
3
4 When foreign governments allow their residents to credit 100 percent of withholding
taxes paid to the U.S., the marginal tax rate faced by foreigners on investments in the U.S.
is that of the home (foreign) country. In this case the efficiency properties of residence-
based taxation are retailed.
3
5 If agents effectively face infinite horizons, capital allocation is intertemporally efficient in
the absence of taxes. Capital income taxes may lead to a path of consumption that is sub-
optimal in terms of intertemporally defined utility: there will be too much present con-
sumption (too little saving) and too little future consumption. See Sandmo (1976).Implications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 133
offset by reductions in other capital taxes.
3
6 Thus, the policy initiative is
likely to have led to a reduction in the efficiency in the intertemporal as
well as the international allocation of capital.
36
a
C. Are Efficiency and Fairness Goals Reconcilable?
These considerations suggest a conflict between efficiency and equity
goals. While it may seem fair for the U.S. to impose additional withhold-
ing taxes selectively on residents of countries which impose similar
taxes, doing so may well worsen the global efficiency of resource alloca-
tion. The outcome does not appear to be fully satisfactory. Are there
other worthwhile options?
One alternative worth considering involves international tax coordi-
nation. A principal goal of such coordination would be achieving a
wider international application of the residence principle. One means to
this end would be removal of withholding taxes by those nations that
currently impose them. To the extent that other nations agree to such
measures, there is less justification on equity grounds for an expanded
U.S. tax. However, until multilateral reductions in withholding taxes are
agreed to, the temporary introduction of U.S. withholding on portfolio
interest might have some value as a bargaining chip. But such U.S.
withholding would not be intended as a permanent fixture.
Unfortunately, in the context of the withholding tax, international
policy coordination faces serious political obstacles. Nations removing
existing withholding taxes face the dilemma of reduced tax revenues or
of having to increase other taxes. The prevalence of withholding taxes
may stem from the fact that they involve relatively small political costs:
those who must pay these taxes have a relatively small political voice
within the country in question. Replacing withholding taxes with taxes
on domestic residents, on the other hand, may involve very large polit-
ical costs. Thus the political barriers to greater adoption of residence-
based taxation through the removal of withholding taxes are formidable.
3
6 The policy simulations involved lump-sum reductions in individual labor and capital
income taxes. These adjustments were made at the level necessary to assure that in each
policy experiment, total tax revenues to each country were the same as those collected in
each country in the base (status quo) case. Because these adjustments were lump-sum and
not restricted to capital, the simulations implied an increase in overall (inclusive of the
withholding tax) capital taxation.
36
3 Higher capital taxes may permit given levels of government expenditure to be provided
with lower taxes on labor. The efficiency losses attributable to higher capital taxes can
conceivably be offset by efficiency gains from lower labor taxes. The model employed in
this paper does not capture these potential offsetting effects, since household labor supply
is exogenous.134 Goulder
D. Tax Evasion and Capital Flight
Several analysts have pointed out that a significant amount of foreign
investment in the U.S. is undertaken in order to evade taxation in the
country of residence.
3
7 Many nations that officially adopt the residence
principle have difficulty preventing tax evasion because of limited infor-
mation concerning income earned from abroad: if investments made
outside the country of residence are not monitored, then such invest-
ments can provide a vehicle for escaping taxes. This problem is particu-
larly severe for less developed countries (LDCs). The cost is not simply a
loss of tax revenues but also a lower rate of domestic capital accumula-
tion and growth.
These difficulties reverse the usual fairness arguments about with-
holding. Referring to the tax evasion problem, some analysts contend
that fairness considerations argue for the expansion of a U.S. withhold-
ing tax. If the U.S. withholds foreigners' interest income, it is no longer
possible to escape capital income taxation by investing in the U.S. Thus,
U.S. withholding of portfolio interest has the virtue of discouraging tax
evasion and capital flight.
The problems of tax evasion and capital flight are indeed serious.
However, introducing a U.S. withholding tax on portfolio interest may
not be the most effective remedy for these difficulties. The evasion prob-
lem ultimately stems from a lack of information on foreign investments;
the most natural solution may be to develop better ways to monitor
investments in the U.S. and provide information on these investments
to foreign governments. Certainly providing information would not
eliminate all tax evasion, capital flight to the U.S., or capital flight to
other countries. But such efforts would appear to be at least as effective
in addressing these problems as an expanded U.S. withholding tax. At
the same time, it would avoid many of the inefficiencies that enlarging
the U.S. withholding tax would generate.
However, any unilateral efforts undertaken by the U.S. are likely to be
limited in their effectiveness in dealing with tax evasion problems. So
long as other nations continue to offer favorable investment opportuni-
ties, unilateral provision of information or expansion of the U.S. with-
holding tax would have the effect of inducing investors from LDCs to
redirect their investments from the U.S. to other nations. Only through
cooperative efforts on the part of all "tax haven" countries can these




7 See, for example, Bird and McLure (1988) and McLure (1989).
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8 See McLure (1989) for a detailed discussion of this issue.Implications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 135
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The complexities of international financial markets and of international
politics make evaluating the withholding tax option a difficult matter.
Existing treaty provisions as well as tax-avoidance options on both
the supply and demand sides of securities markets substantially limit
the opportunities to obtain additional revenues through expansion
of the U.S. withholding tax.
The introduction of a statutory 30 percent U.S. withholding tax on
foreigners' interest income, if not accompanied by similar (retaliatory)
tax measures by foreign governments, appears to yield aggregate do-
mestic welfare gains. The gains are attributable to U.S. financial market
power and to induced increases in domestic saving. U.S. market power
stems from the large share represented by the U.S. of world financial
transactions and from the imperfect substitutability between U.S. and
foreign securities in portfolios. Simulations suggest that these gains
more than compensate for adverse distortionary effects of the tax. Al-
though the tax initially has a favorable effect on the U.S. trade balance
and aggregate exports, it ultimately has the opposite effect. The com-
mon proposition that a withholding tax would help relieve the U.S.
trade deficit appears to be valid only for the short term.
On the other hand, if foreign governments respond in kind to the U.S.
introduction of withholding on portfolio interest, U.S. residents' aggre-
gate welfare declines. Under these circumstances, effects on net trade
flows and on the U.S. net foreign asset position are much smaller.
Regardless of whether it is matched by similar measures by foreign
governments, expanding the U.S. withholding tax seems to imply a
reduction in the global efficiency of resource allocation. The efficiency
costs may arise because the tax represents a departure from the resi-
dence principle of taxation (to the extent that foreign governments do
not provide credits for U.S. withholding taxes paid) and because it im-
plies an increase in the overall level of capital taxation.
The equity arguments for the withholding tax are mixed. An unap-
pealing feature of a unilateral U.S. withholding tax initiative is that the
gains in U.S. welfare come at the expense of foreigners. Restricting the
application of the tax to investors from countries that already impose
similar measures may have more justification on fairness grounds than
applying the tax to all foreign investors. An attraction of the tax is its
ability to discourage capital flight to the U.S. and associated tax evasion;
however, other policies with less serious efficiency costs might be
equally effective in addressing tax evasion problems.136 Goulder
APPENDIX
1. Welfare Implications of Financial Market Power
of U.S.
Define rm as the return paid to foreigners on Km, U.S. capital imports; rm
is therefore the U.S. interest rate net of the withholding tax. Define rx as
the return paid to U.S. residents on Kx, U.S. capital exports (U.S. resi-
dents' portfolio investments abroad); if foreigners do not impose with-
holding taxes, this is simply the gross rate of return offered abroad
translated into dollars. By calculating the foreign rate in dollar terms,
one avoids the need to consider exchange rate movements explicitly.
A large share of world financial transactions and imperfect substitut-
ability between domestic and foreign securities can (each) alter the wel-
fare effects of a withholding tax through their influence on rxKx - rmKm/ the value of net interest income to the U.S. Large market share enables a
U.S. withholding tax to drive down the rates rm and rx. If securities are
perfect substitutes, then rm must equal rx. The welfare influence depends
on the induced change in rxKx - rmKm/ and since rx = rm, it depends on the change in r(Kx — Km), where r represents the common international
interest rate. If the U.S. is a net capital exporter (Kx> Km) and the tax
doesn't alter much the difference between Kx and Km, then the induced
reduction in r lowers net interest income and thereby has a negative
influence on welfare. The reverse is the case for a net capital importer.
Imperfect asset substitutability enables the U.S. to force down rm be-
low the rate rx. This is possible even when the U.S. share of world
financial transactions is small. Again, the influence on welfare depends
on the induced change in rxKx — rmKm. Ceteris paribus, lower asset substi- tutability allows for a larger relative reduction in rm. This implies an
increase in domestic net interest income. Thus, lower asset substitutabil-
ity tends to exert a positive influence on the domestic welfare effects of
withholding.
2. Welfare Implications of Prior Taxes on Domestic
Saving and Investment
a. Prior Taxes on Saving. Figure 3a indicates the economic equilibria
that result in the presence and absence of pre-existing taxes on domestic
saving. The OCS and MPC schedules represent the opportunity cost of
saving and marginal product of capital, as before. In the absence of
taxes, these schedules correspond to supply curves for domestic saving
and investment. For an economy that is a price-taker in capital markets,
equilibrium domestic saving and investment are at levels SDi and JD1.
Introducing a withholding tax at the rate tw yields equilibrium savingImplications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 137
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FIGURE 3b. Effects of Withholding Tax in Presence of Prior
Investment Taxes138 Goulder
and investment of SD2 and ZD2. The aggregate welfare loss is given by the
triangular regions cih and dkj, corresponding to the regions B and D
described previously in Section III.
The implications of a prior tax on domestic saving are as follows. The
domestic supply curve is now S', where the horizontal distance between
S' and OCS is the tax paid per unit of saving. In the absence of withhold-
ing, equilibrium domestic saving is now Sd3, while equilibrium domestic
investment is still ID1. Introducing a withholding tax in this environment
leads to a new equilibrium with domestic saving and investment of SD4
and ID2/ respectively. Under these conditions, domestic savers gain the
region Imon, which, if saving taxes are proportional, corresponds to the
region abfe. Domestic borrowers, as before, lose adke. Taxpayers gain the
withholding tax revenues cdji + fbmo (shaded region), the taxes col-
lected on the additional saving SD4: - SD3. The aggregate welfare loss is
bfg + dkj less the additional saving taxes, fbmo. Under proportional
saving taxes, bgf corresponds to cih; thus, the difference between the
aggregate welfare effect in this case and in the case without prior saving
taxes is fbmo. This area is the gain associated with realizing the excess of
the marginal social benefit of saving over its marginal social cost as
domestic saving rises from SD3 to SD4-
A similar analysis can be employed to show that prior progressive
saving taxes do not augment the potential gains (or reduce the losses)
from a withholding tax as much as prior proportional saving taxes do:
the improvement in welfare relative to the case of no prior saving taxes
will be less than the value of the induced new saving taxes.
b. Prior Taxes on Investment. The analysis for prior investment taxes
is analogous. Figure 3b indicates the economic equilibria in the presence
and absence of such prior taxes. If there are no prior taxes, equilibrium
saving and investment are SDi and 7D1 with no withholding and SD2 and ID2 following the imposition of a withholding tax.
With a tax on investment, the investment schedule is I' and equilib-
rium domestic saving and investment are SDi and ID3 before withhold-
ing. Implementing the withholding tax leads to the equilibrium with
saving and investment of SD2 and JD4- Domestic savers gain ache and
domestic borrowers lose aqve. Taxpayers gain cqui in withholding tax
revenues but lose the revenues wxvq (shaded region) that previously
were collected from the investment tax. The aggregate loss is cih + qvu
plus wxvq, the lost investment tax revenues. Under proportional invest-
ment taxes, qvu equals dkj; hence in these circumstances pre-existing
investment taxes imply that aggregate welfare losses will be larger by
the amount of foregone investment tax revenue, wxvq. This area is theImplications of Introducing Withholding Taxes 139
loss associated with the failure to enjoy the excess of the marginal social
benefit of investment over its marginal social cost for potential invest-
ments from 7D4 to ID3. A similar analysis reveals that under progressive
investment taxes, the aggregate welfare losses exceed the losses with no
prior investment taxes by an amount less than the value of foregone
investment tax revenue.
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